But if one slaughtered a bird offering outside the courtyard and then offered it up outside, he is liable.

Evidently, the manner of its preparation inside the courtyard, i.e., pinching, effects its exemption outside the courtyard, and the manner of its preparation outside the courtyard, i.e., slaughter, effects its exemption inside the courtyard.

Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.

GEMARA: In summarizing its rulings the mishna states: The manner of its preparation outside the courtyard effects its exemption inside the courtyard. The Gemara comments: This term: The manner of its preparation, is inappropriate when referring to the slaughter of a bird offering, as a bird offering is not prepared by slaughtering; on the contrary, it is disqualified if slaughtered. The slaughter of a bird offering outside the courtyard is the reason for its liability. The Gemara concedes: Emend the mishna and teach: Its liability.

§ The mishna cites the ruling of Rabbi Shimon: Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt. The Gemara asks: To what does he refer?

If we say that he is referring to the first clause of the mishna, which states: One who pinches the nape of the bird offering inside and then offers it up outside is liable, but if one pinched its nape outside and then offered it up outside, he is exempt; and it is with the second part of this clause that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says to the first tanna: Just as one who pinches the nape of a bird offering inside and then offers it up outside is liable, so too one who pinches its nape outside and then offers it up outside is liable, this is difficult. If that is what Rabbi Shimon intended, then instead of saying in the mishna: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, he should have said: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed inside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for a similar act of killing done outside the courtyard. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the first tanna on this issue.

Rather, perhaps Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the first part of the first clause and says to the first tanna: Just as one who pinches the nape of a bird offering outside and then offers it up outside is not liable, so too one who pinches its nape inside and then offers it up outside is not liable. The Gemara rejects this: If that is what Rabbi Shimon intended, then he should have said: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is not liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also not liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the first tanna on this issue either.

Rather, he is referring to the latter clause of the mishna: One who slaughters a bird offering inside and offers it up outside is exempt, but if one slaughtered a bird offering outside and then offered it up outside, he is liable. And it is with the second part of this clause that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says to the first tanna: Just as one who slaughters a bird offering inside and then offers it up outside is not liable, so too one who slaughters it outside and then offers it up outside is not liable. The Gemara rejects this: If that is what Rabbi Shimon intended, then he should have said: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed inside the courtyard, one is not liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also not liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing outside the courtyard. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the first tanna on this issue.

Rather, perhaps Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the first part of the latter clause and says to the first tanna: Just as one who slaughters a bird offering outside and then offers it up outside is liable, so too one who slaughters it inside and then offers it up outside is liable. The Gemara rejects this: Rabbi Shimon clearly does not hold this, as the mishna teaches that he concludes: This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.

If Rabbi Shimon is not referring to any of the rulings mentioned in the mishna, he must be disagreeing with the first tanna with regard to another issue. Ze’eiri said: The difference between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon is with regard to the slaughter of an animal offering at night inside the courtyard, and this is what the mishna is saying: The first tanna said: And so too, one who slaughters an animal offering inside the courtyard at night and then offers it up outside is exempt, as by slaughtering the animal at night he caused it to become disqualified. But one who slaughtered an animal outside the courtyard at night and then offered it up outside is liable.

It is with this ruling that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.

The Gemara provides another suggestion: Rava said that the difference between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon is with regard to the collection of the blood of an offering in a non-sacred vessel, and this is what the mishna is saying: The first tanna said: And so too, one who collects the blood of an offering in a non-sacred vessel inside the courtyard and then offers up that offering outside is exempt, as receiving blood in a non-sacred vessel disqualifies the offering. But one who collects the blood of an offering in a non-sacred vessel outside the courtyard and then offers up that offering outside is liable.

It is with this ruling that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says: With regard to any act done with an animal, i.e., the collecting of its blood, concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act inside the courtyard. This is the halakha except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.

The Gemara comments: Now that Shmuel’s father, son of Rav Yitzḥak, has taught a baraita, another explanation can be provided. The baraita teaches: One who pinches the nape of a bird inside the courtyard and then offers it up outside is liable, but one who pinched the nape of a bird outside and then offered it up outside is exempt. And Rabbi Shimon says that he is liable. It is apparent then that Rabbi Shimon in the mishna is referring to there, i.e., to the first clause of the mishna, and disagreeing with it. Therefore, one should emend the mishna and teach: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed inside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing outside the courtyard.

MISHNA: With regard to a sin offering where one collected its blood in one cup, if he first placed its blood on an altar outside the courtyard and then placed the remaining blood on the altar inside the courtyard, or if he first placed its blood on the altar inside the courtyard and then placed the remaining blood on an altar outside the courtyard, in both cases he is liable for placing the blood outside the courtyard, as the blood in its entirety is fit to be placed on the altar inside the courtyard.

If one collected its blood in two cups and placed the blood from both of them on the altar inside the courtyard he is exempt as he acted appropriately. If he placed the blood from both of them on an altar outside the courtyard, he is liable, as both are fit to be placed inside. If he first placed the blood from one cup inside and then placed the blood from the other one outside, he is exempt. By using the blood of the first cup to perform the mitzva of placing the blood on the altar, he thereby rendered the blood in the second cup unfit to be placed on the altar; therefore, there is no liability for placing it on an altar outside. If he first placed the blood from one cup outside and then placed the blood from the other one inside, he is liable for the external placement as that blood was fit to be placed inside, and the internal placement atones for the transgression for which the sin offering was brought.

To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a case where one separated an animal for his sin offering and it was lost, and he separated another animal in its place, and thereafter, the first animal was found. In that case, both of them stand before him and he must sacrifice one as his sin offering. If he slaughtered both of them inside the courtyard, he is exempt. If he slaughtered both of them outside the courtyard, he is liable, as each was fit to be slaughtered in the courtyard. If he first slaughtered one inside and then slaughtered the other one outside he is exempt from liability for slaughtering the second, as he has already fulfilled his obligation with the first, thereby rendering the second one unfit for sacrifice. If he first slaughtered one outside and then slaughtered the other one inside he is liable for slaughtering the external animal outside the courtyard, as it was fit to be slaughtered inside, and the internal animal atones for the transgression for which the sin offering was brought.

The mishna adds: In a case where one slaughtered both inside the courtyard, just as placing the blood of the first animal exempts one who consumes its meat from liability for misuse of consecrated property, so too, it exempts one who consumes the meat of its counterpart, the second animal, from liability.